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Introduct ion
We are in the midst of an information revolution, and we are only be-
ginning to understand its implications. The past few decades have
witnessed a dramatic transformation in the way we shop, bank, and
go about our daily business—changes that have resulted in an un-
precedented proliferation of records and data. Small details that were
once captured in dim memories or fading scraps of paper are now
preserved forever in the digital minds of computers, in vast databases
with fertile fields of personal data. Our wallets are stuffed with ATM
cards, calling cards, frequent shopper cards, and credit cards—all of
which can be used to record where we are and what we do. Every day,
rivulets of information stream into electric brains to be sifted, sorted,
rearranged, and combined in hundreds of different ways. Digital
technology enables the preservation of the minutia of our everyday
comings and goings, of our likes and dislikes, of who we are and what
we own. It is ever more possible to create an electronic collage that
covers much of a person’s life—a life captured in records, a digital
person composed in the collective computer networks of the world.
We are currently confronting the rise of what I refer to as “digital
dossiers.” A dossier is a collection of detailed data about an individ-
ual. Dossiers are used in European courts to assemble information
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about a person in order to reach a judgment. Today, through the use
of computers, dossiers are being constructed about all of us. Data is
digitized into binary numerical form, which enables computers to
store and manipulate it with unprecedented efficiency. There are
hundreds of companies that are constructing gigantic databases of
psychological profiles, amassing data about an individual’s race, gen-
der, income, hobbies, and purchases. Shards of data from our daily
existence are now being assembled and analyzed—to investigate
backgrounds, check credit, market products, and make a wide variety
of decisions affecting our lives.
This book is about how we should understand and protect privacy
in light of these profound technological developments. Our old con-
ceptions of privacy are not up to the task. Much of the law pertaining
to privacy is based on these conceptions, and as a result, it has failed
to resolve the emerging privacy problems created by digital dossiers.
This book aims to rethink longstanding notions of privacy to grapple
with the consequences of living in an Information Age.
The Problems of Digital Dossiers
New Technologies and New Problems. In earlier times, communities were
small and intimate. Personal information was preserved in the mem-
ories of friends, family, and neighbors, and it was spread by gossip
and storytelling. Today, the predominant mode of spreading informa-
tion is not through the flutter of gossiping tongues but through the
language of electricity, where information pulses between massive
record systems and databases. On the upside, this development
means that individuals can more readily escape from the curious eyes
of the community, freeing themselves from stifling social norms in-
hibiting individuality and creativity. On the downside, an ever-grow-
ing series of records is created about almost every facet of a person’s
life. As businesses and the government increasingly share personal
information, digital dossiers about nearly every individual are being
assembled. This raises serious concerns. The information gathered
about us has become quite extensive, and it is being used in ways that
profoundly affect our lives. Yet, we know little about how our personal
information is being used, and we lack the power to do much about it.
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Digital dossiers are constructed and used through three types of
“information flow.”1 Information flow is a way of describing the
movement of data. Like water in an elaborate system of plumbing,
data flows through information pipelines linking various businesses,
organizations, and government entities. First, information often flows
between large computer databases of private-sector companies. Sec-
ond, data flows from government public record systems to a variety of
businesses in the private sector. Indeed, many companies construct
their databases by culling personal data from public records. Third,
information flows from the private sector to government agencies
and law enforcement officials. The increase in digital dossiers has
thus resulted in an elaborate lattice of information networking, where
information is being stored, analyzed, and used in ways that have
profound implications for society.
Even if we’re not aware of it, the use of digital dossiers is shaping
our lives. Companies use digital dossiers to determine how they do
business with us; financial institutions use them to determine
whether to give us credit; employers turn to them to examine our
backgrounds when hiring; law enforcement officials draw on them to
investigate us; and identity thieves tap into them to commit fraud.
Computer Databases. Computers and cyberspace have vastly in-
creased our ability to collect, store, and analyze information. Today, it
seems as if everyone is collecting information—the media, employ-
ers, businesses, and government. Countless companies maintain
computerized records of their customers’ preferences, purchases,
and activities. There are hundreds of records detailing an individual’s
consumption. Credit card companies maintain information about
one’s credit card purchases. Video stores keep records about one’s
video rentals. Online retailers, such as Amazon.com, preserve records
of all the books and other items a person buys. And there are hun-
dreds of companies people aren’t even aware of that maintain their
personal information. For example, Wiland Services maintains a
database of about , different points of information on over 
million individuals.2 Acxiom.com collects and sells data on con-
sumers to marketers. In its InfoBase, it provides “[o]ver  demo-
graphic variables . . . including age, income, real property data,
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children’s data, and others.” It also contains data on education levels,
occupation, height, weight, political affiliation, ethnicity, race, hob-
bies, and net worth.3
Computers enable marketers to collect detailed dossiers of per-
sonal information and to analyze it to predict the consumer’s behav-
ior. Through various analytic techniques, marketers construct models
of what products particular customers will desire and how to encour-
age customers to consume. Companies know how we spend our
money, what we do for a living, how much we earn, and where we live.
They know about our ethnic backgrounds, religion, political views,
and health problems. Not only do companies know what we have al-
ready purchased, but they also have a good idea about what books we
will soon buy or what movies we will want to see.
Public Records. Imagine that the government had the power to compel
individuals to reveal a vast amount of personal information about
themselves—where they live; their phone numbers; their physical de-
scription; their photograph; their age; their medical problems; all of
their legal transgressions throughout their lifetimes; the names of
their parents, children, and spouses; their political party affiliations;
where they work and what they do; the property that they own and its
value; and sometimes even their psychotherapists’ notes, doctors’
records, and financial information.
Then imagine that the government routinely poured this informa-
tion into the public domain—by posting it on the Internet where it
could be accessed from all over the world, by giving it away to any in-
dividual or company that asked for it, or even by providing entire
databases of personal information upon request. Think about how
this information would be available to those who make important de-
cisions about an individual’s life and career—such as whether the in-
dividual will get a loan or a job. Also consider that, in many cases, the
individual would not even know that the information is being used to
make these decisions.
Imagine as well that this information would be traded among hun-
dreds of private-sector companies that would combine it with a host
of other information such as one’s hobbies, purchases, magazines, or-
ganizations, credit history, and so on. This expanded profile would
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then be sold back to the government in order to investigate and mon-
itor individuals more efficiently.
Stop imagining. What I described is a growing reality in the United
States, and the threat posed to privacy is rapidly becoming worse.
Federal, state, and local governments maintain public records span-
ning an individual’s life from birth to death. These records contain a
myriad of personal details. Until recently, public records were difficult
to access—finding information about a person often involved a scav-
enger hunt through local offices to dig up records. But with the Inter-
net, public records are increasingly being posted online, where
anybody anywhere can easily obtain and search them.
Government Access. The data in digital dossiers increasingly flows
from the private sector to the government, particularly for law en-
forcement use. Law enforcement agencies have long sought personal
information about individuals from various companies and financial
institutions to investigate fraud, white-collar crime, drug trafficking,
computer crime, child pornography, and other types of criminal ac-
tivity. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September , ,
the impetus for the government to gather personal information has
greatly increased, since this data can be useful to track down terror-
ists and to profile airline passengers for more thorough searches. De-
tailed records of an individual’s reading materials, purchases,
diseases, and website activity enable the government to assemble a
profile of an individual’s finances, health, psychology, beliefs, politics,
interests, and lifestyle. Many people communicate over the Internet
using a screen name or pseudonym; the data in digital dossiers can
unveil their identities as well as expose all of the people with whom
they associate and do business.
The government has recently been exploring ways to develop tech-
nology to detect patterns of behavior based on our dossiers. In ,
it was revealed that the Department of Defense was developing a pro-
gram called Total Information Awareness (since renamed Terrorism
Information Awareness). The program begins with the government
amassing personal information from private-sector sources into a
massive database of dossiers on individuals. Profiling technology is
then used to detect those who are likely to be engaged in criminal
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activity. When Congress learned of Total Information Awareness, it
halted the program because of its threat to privacy. However, the
same type of collection and use of data envisioned by those who
dreamed up Total Information Awareness is already being carried out
by the government. The digital dossiers that continue to grow in the
private sector and in public records are now becoming a tool for the
government to monitor and investigate people.
What Is the Problem? The growing collection and use of personal infor-
mation in digital form has long been viewed as problematic—a fear
typically raised under the banner of “privacy.” The use of personal in-
formation certainly presents privacy problems, but what exactly is
the nature of these problems? Although the problems of personal in-
formation are understood as concerns over privacy, beyond this, they
are often not well defined. How much weight should our vague appre-
hensions be given, especially considering the tremendous utility,
profit, and efficiency of using personal information?
The answer to this question depends upon how these privacy
problems are conceptualized. Unfortunately, so far, the problems
have not been adequately articulated. Many discussions of privacy
merely scratch the surface by simply pointing out a series of techno-
logical developments with the assumption that people will react with
anxiety. Rarely do discussions about privacy delve deeper. We need a
better understanding of the problems; we must learn how they devel-
oped, how they are connected, what precisely they threaten, and how
they can be solved.
This book aims to reconceptualize privacy in today’s world of rap-
idly changing technology. The task of conceptualizing the privacy
problems digital dossiers create is of the utmost importance. As John
Dewey aptly wrote, “a problem well put is half-solved.”4 We can’t really
solve a problem until we know the harm that it causes. A good diag-
nosis of a problem goes a long way toward finding solutions to it.
The goal of this book extends beyond articulating a new under-
standing of contemporary privacy problems; the book also aims to
demonstrate the ways that the problems can be solved. In particular,
this is a book about the law. A relatively robust amount of law has de-
veloped to protect privacy, but it has often failed to be effective when
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confronted by the problems of the Information Age. This book dis-
cusses why this has happened and what can be done about it.
Traditional Conceptions of Privacy
Traditionally, privacy violations have been understood in a particular
manner. In this book, I contend that these ways of understanding pri-
vacy must be rethought in order to fully comprehend the problems
with digital dossiers. This doesn’t mean that these understandings are
incorrect. They arose with earlier privacy problems and can certainly
be of help in understanding digital dossiers. But these more tradi-
tional ways of understanding privacy don’t account for key aspects of
the unique problems the digital age has introduced.
Orwell’s Big Brother. The dominant metaphor for modern invasions of
privacy is Big Brother, the ruthless totalitarian government in George
Orwell’s novel 1984. Big Brother oppresses its citizens, purges dis-
senters, and spies on everyone in their homes. The result is a cold,
drab, grey world with hardly any space for love, joy, original thinking,
spontaneity, or creativity. It is a society under total control. Although
the metaphor has proven quite useful for a number of privacy prob-
lems, it only partially captures the problems of digital dossiers. Big
Brother envisions a centralized authoritarian power that aims for ab-
solute control, but the digital dossiers constructed by businesses
aren’t controlled by a central power, and their goal is not to oppress us
but to get us to buy new products and services. Even our government
is a far cry from Big Brother, for most government officials don’t act
out of malicious intent or a desire for domination. Moreover, Big
Brother achieves its control by brutally punishing people for disobe-
dience and making people fear they are constantly being watched.
But businesses don’t punish us so long as we keep on buying, and
they don’t make us feel as though we are being watched. To the con-
trary, they try to gather information as inconspicuously as possible.
Making us feel threatened would undermine rather than advance the
goal of unencumbered information collection. Finally, while Big
Brother aims to control the most intimate details of a citizen’s life,
much of the information in digital dossiers is not intimate or unusual.
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The Secrecy Paradigm. In another traditional way of understanding pri-
vacy that I refer to as the “secrecy paradigm,” privacy is invaded by
uncovering one’s hidden world, by surveillance, and by the disclosure
of concealed information. The harm such invasions cause consists of
inhibition, self-censorship, embarrassment, and damage to one’s rep-
utation. The law is heavily influenced by this paradigm. As a result, if
the information isn’t secret, then courts often conclude that the infor-
mation can’t be private. However, this conception of privacy is not re-
sponsive to life in the modern Information Age, where most personal
information exists in the record systems of hundreds of entities. Life
today is fueled by information, and it is virtually impossible to live as
an Information Age ghost, leaving no trail or residue.
The Invasion Conception. Under the traditional view, privacy is violated
by the invasive actions of particular wrongdoers who cause direct in-
jury to victims. Victims experience embarrassment, mental distress,
or harm to their reputations. The law responds when a person’s deep-
est secrets are exposed, reputation is tarnished, or home is invaded.
This view, which I call the “invasion conception,” understands pri-
vacy to be a kind of invasion, in which somebody invades and some-
body is invaded. However, digital dossiers often do not result in any
overt invasion. People frequently don’t experience any direct injury
when data about them is aggregated or transferred from one com-
pany to another. Moreover, many of the problems of digital dossiers
emerge from the collaboration of a multitude of different actors with
different purposes. Each step along the way is relatively small and in-
nocuous, failing to cause harm that the invasion conception would
recognize as substantial.
Rethinking Privacy
Digital dossiers pose significant problems, and for a more complete
understanding of these issues, I turn to another metaphor—Franz
Kafka’s depiction of bureaucracy in The Trial. Kafka’s novel chronicles
the surreal nightmare of a person who is unexpectedly informed that
he is under arrest but given no reason why. A bureaucratic court
maintains a dossier about him, but he has no access to this informa-
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tion. Throughout the rest of the novel, the protagonist desperately at-
tempts to find out why the Court is interested in his life, but his quest
is hopeless—the Court is too clandestine and labyrinthine to be fully
understood.
The Trial captures an individual’s sense of helplessness, frustra-
tion, and vulnerability when a large bureaucratic organization has
control over a vast dossier of details about one’s life. Bureaucracy of-
ten results in a routinized and sometimes careless way of handling in-
formation—with little to no accountability. This makes people
vulnerable to identity theft, stalking, and other harms. The problem is
not simply a loss of control over personal information, nor is there a
diabolical motive or plan for domination as with Big Brother. The
problem is a bureaucratic process that is uncontrolled. These bureau-
cratic ways of using our information have palpable effects on our
lives because people use our dossiers to make important decisions
about us to which we are not always privy.
Thus far, the existing law protecting information privacy has not
adequately responded to the emergence of digital dossiers. We need
to better articulate what the problems are, what is at stake, and what
precisely the law must do to solve the problems. We must rethink pri-
vacy for the Information Age.
A Roadmap for This Book
In part I, I explore the digital dossiers about individuals that are being
assembled through computer databases and the Internet. I focus pri-
marily on the activities of businesses. Chapter  traces the history of
the developing privacy problems precipitated by computer databases
and cyberspace. In chapter , I examine the prevailing ways that these
privacy problems have been conceptualized. I discuss the predomi-
nance of the Orwell metaphor and why it must be supplemented with
the Kafka metaphor. Chapter  discusses why the law of information
privacy has failed to grapple adequately with the problem of digital
dossiers. Chapter  responds to those who argue that the market
(alone or with some minor tinkering) can appropriately deal with the
problem. In chapter , I argue that beyond a set of individual rights,
protecting privacy requires an architecture that regulates the way
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information may be collected and used. Consequently, protecting
privacy must focus not merely on remedies and penalties for ag-
grieved individuals but on shaping an architecture to govern the ever-
increasing data flows of the Information Age.
Part II turns to the way in which public records contribute to the
problems of digital dossiers. Chapter  describes the increasing accu-
mulation of personal information in public record systems and the
emerging threats to privacy posed by the increased accessibility of
this information as records are made available on the Internet. In
chapter , I argue that the regulation of public records in the United
States must be rethought in light of the new technologies in the Infor-
mation Age, and I advance a theory about how to reconcile the ten-
sion between transparency and privacy. I also explore why regulating
the access and use of public records will not infringe upon First
Amendment rights.
Part III examines the problems created by the increasing govern-
ment access to digital dossiers. In chapter , I explore in detail the nu-
merous ways that the government is accessing personal information
held by private-sector businesses and why this is problematic. Chap-
ter  discusses how the Supreme Court has improperly interpreted
the Fourth Amendment so that it doesn’t apply to records maintained
by third parties, a result that virtually prevents the Fourth Amend-
ment from dealing with the problem of government access to digital
dossiers. In the void left by the inapplicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment, Congress has enacted a series of statutes to address the prob-
lem. As I explain, however, the statutes create a regulatory regime that
is uneven, overly complex, and filled with gaps and loopholes. In
chapter , I explore how the law should appropriately regulate gov-
ernment access to personal information maintained by the private
sector.
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